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1. The Variety of Ethical Analysis 
The ethical issues surrounding human experimentation are complex 
and, I suspect, some of them are irresolvable. I am going to try to 
describe how ethicists tend to frame the ethical concerns involved in 
the experimental use of human subjects. However, I must ask you to 
keep in mind that there is no ethically neutral way to describe a moral 
problem. Indeed the very designation of a "problem" depends on 
prior moral presuppositions. For example, different positions concern-
ing the use of human subjects are often thought to be determined by 
whether a deontological or teleological pattern of moral justifications 
is dominant. Yet this very way of construing the dispute may conceal 
a more fundamental disagreement about how to describe morally what 
human experimentation involves. Thus while I am trying to act pri-
marily as a reporter, you should suspect that my commitments color 
the way I describe the ethical issues involved in the use of human 
subjects in research. 
2. Protection of the Individual Versus the Benefit to Mankind 
Perhaps the most basic as well as the most heated issue surrounding 
the use of human subjects in research is the assumption by some that 
the primary ethical question is whether the benefits of any research 
are sufficient to justify certain risks to the subject. In other words 
many in the research community seem to assume that the question of 
the moral justification of research on human beings is a matter of 
providing more information about comparative benefits and risks. The 
experiment is thought justified if it has been carefully designed and 
can be shown that the actual or potential benefit outweighs the risk. 
Others, however, have argued that this way of stating the moral 
issue is to already beg the principal moral question. They argue that 
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the teleological assumption - that is the idea that the good conse-
quences outweigh the bad - involved in this kind of ethical cost-
benefit analysis fails to do justice to the basic commitment to respect 
and protect each human person. Put differently , it is argued that no 
amount of benefit can ever justify using one person as a means for the 
good of others. Those who assume that the ethical issue is one of 
balancing some risks against future goods fail to see, therefore , that 
respect for the integrity of the individual cannot be balanced by the 
benefits gained - no matter how the benefits might be understood. 
Thus Jay Katz argues that what must be recognized is that there is an 
inherent value conflict in the conduct of human research - "the quest 
for the acquisition of knowledge for the benefit of present and futurEi! 
generations on the one hand ; and the respect for the dignity, 
autonomy, and inviolability (unless consented to) of the subjects of 
research." 1 
Those who argue that the protection of the human subject is the 
overriding ethical issue for human experimentation do not intend this 
demand to deny any use of human subjects in research. Rather they 
argue that any experiment must provide proper safeguards for the 
human subject . If such safeguards cannot be provided, then the experi-
ment cannot be done even if it would have great benefit for present 
and future generations. Ethically this means that no basic value can be 
overridden for a higher good except if it can be shown that another 
basic value is at stake. For those who see themselves serving the future 
of mankind through the office of science, this position appears 
unduly restrictive. 
If the Conference on Experiments and Research with Humans spon-
sored by the National Academy of Science in 1975 2 was any example, 
I am afraid that we have a long way to go before t his conflict is 
resolved. (Moreover, it is hard to see how we can expect it to be solved 
in this context when it has not been resolved at the level of ethical 
theory.) For neither side seems to be able to speak to the concerns of 
the other. Scientists cannot understand how anyone can fail to appre-
ciate the benefits to be gained through science for the good of man-
kind. Talk of the " inviolability of the individual" appears as an 
irrational commitment that is holding back important developments 
for the cure of disease or opening up new vistas of human understand-
ing. 
Those concerned with the protection of human subjects as t he over-
riding value, however, tend to think that research scientists naively 
assume that what is good for science is also good for mankind. Just as 
what is good for business is not necessarily good for America, they 
argue that the assumed importance of science for human betterment, 
both morally and materially, must be shown rather than simply 
asserted. For scientists often seem to assume that their activity can be 
justified on the simple utilitarian grounds of the greatest good for the 
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greatest number. Yet utilitarianism as an ethical theory remains prob-
lematic because it fails to account for some of our central intuitions 
about what we can justly do and not do . 
Even though I am sympathetic with those who have argued for the 
priority of protection of the human subject, I think they have not as 
yet provided convincing grounds for their allegiance to the individual. 
Ramsey's contention that "no man is good enough to experiment 
upon another without his consent," 3 seems to strike a chord within 
us, but it is not clear why this is the case. Of course it is possible to 
argue within the framework of liberal political theory that we simply 
have a " right" not to be subjected to the interests of others. This 
response continues to assume that we have a clear idea of what 
"rights" involve or how they can be justified. But this is not the case. 
As Alastair MacIntyre has recently observed, "It is an interesting 
paradox that those eighteenth century writers such as Jefferson or 
Robespierre who believed that they intuited timeless truths about the 
rights of man did so in a vocabulary that had historically come into 
existence as a child of late medieval legal usage and which does not 
seem to be found in the precise senses in which they used it until a 
hundred and fifty years or so before their own time. But it is easy to 
understand why it did emerge as a central moral as well as legal con-
cept. The central preoccupation of both ancient and medieval com-
munities was characteristically: how may men together realize the true 
human good? The central preoccupation of modern men is and has 
been characteristically: how may we prevent men interfering with 
each other as each of us goes about our own concerns? The classical 
view begins with the community of the polis and with the individual 
viewed as having no moral identity apart from the communities of 
kinship and citizenship; the modern view begins with the concept of a 
collection of individuals and the problem of how out of and by indi-
viduals social institutions can be constructed. "4 
If MacIntyre is right about this, and I think he is, then in an inter-
esting way the appeal to "rights" to protect research subjects presup-
poses the same individualistic presuppositions as utilitarianism . This 
may reveal that, while appearing antagonistic, the debate between the 
teleologist and deontologist on this issue may be a debate between 
brothers. Or, more accurately, it helps us see that to construe the issue 
of the use of human subjects in terms of a choice between teleological 
or deontological ethical theories is misleading. For the issue is what 
kind of risks should we as citizens and recipients of the benefits of 
health science be willing to undergo to further the general well-being 
of our community. 
But if this is the right way to frame the question it cannot be 
answered in terms of the current discussion, but rather must await the 
development of a new sense of political community and resulting 
political and ethical theory. For only then can we stand back from 
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abstractions such as "the good of mankind" or "the rights of the 
individual" and be clear about what ends and values science can and 
should serve. With the articulation of such-ends we may well find the 
grounds to say why each of us should be willing to serve as research 
subjects for the good, not of mankind, but of the communities in 
which we exist.5 Because we do not share these values, however, the 
only way we feel that we can protect ourselves from one another is by 
insisting on the procedural rule of informed consent. In other words, 
what we have here is the typical liberal strategy to substitute pro-
cedure for the absence of debate on substantive norms and values. 
3. Therapeutic and Non-Therapeutic Experimentation 
It can be objected that I have overstated the unclarity of the moral 
values and ends that give direction to contemporary research. To be 
sure, there is an important distinction between therapeutic and non-
therapeutic experimentation that suggests we have a clearer idea of 
what we are doing in therapeutic cases. But we also know that this 
distinction is often easier to draw in theory than it is in practice. For 
example, there are good grounds to think, in spite of the wide practice 
of kidney transplants, that such procedure is still an experimental 
technique.6 Furthermore, it remains unclear if random clinical trials 
should be viewed as therapeutic or non-therapeutic even though med-
ical progress depends on such testing.7 For the issue is: medical 
progress for whom - the immediately sick person or future patient 
populations? 
The question of who the doctor's patient is or should be is often 
not easy to determine, but it is complicated by the realization that we 
are no longer sure what health and illness mean. As Charles Fried has 
suggested, "The concept of good health implies a concept of the good 
life, and the goodness of life includes a large number of other factors 
besides simply its length."8 Thus the doctor's primary duty is not the 
prevention of death, but rather the preservation of bodily integrity 
necessary for the realization of a reasonable and realistic life plan. 9 
But we have little consensus about what kind of medicine should be 
developed since we are unclear what constitutes a "reasonable and 
realistic life plan." But concretely this means we have no way of 
determining whether we should develop heart transplant procedures in 
order to provide some with opportunities not normally thought to be 
a possibility. For the expense of providing those opportunities for 
some must lessen basic medical care for others. 
Even if we knew better what health means or should mean it is 
unclear how this would help us direct the research not directly asso-
ciated with therapeutic ends. For example, some of the hard cases 
involving the use of human subjects in research are clearly non-thera-
peutic - that is the research aims to obtain information of use to 
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others and thus does not pretend to treat some illness that the experi-
mental subject might have. Thus the justification for using human 
subjects in such research is made more intense because the design and 
ends of such experiments are remote from the therapeutic context. 
4. Informed Consent 
Of course many assume that the requirement of "informed con-
sent" is a sufficient safeguard to protect subjects involved in thera-
peutic and non-therapeutic experimentation. Informed consent at 
least means that the doctor or the experimenter must give the subject 
the facts necessary to make an informed choice. That means that if 
the subject is ill he must have a clear sense of the diagnosis of his 
illness and the prognosis without treatment. Also the patient must 
have an idea of the benefits and risks of the treatment as well as the 
hazards and advantages of alternative forms of treatment. 
Fried summarizes the rules that define informed consent as : "1) A 
fair explanation of the procedures to be followed, and their purposes, 
including identification of any procedures which are experimental; 
2) A description of the attendant discomforts and risks reasonably to 
be expected; 3) A description of any benefits reasonably to be 
expected; 4) A disclosure of any appropriate alternative procedures 
that might be advantageous for the subject; 5) An offer to answer any 
inquiries concerning the procedures; and 6) An instruction that the 
subject is free to withdraw his consent and to discontinue participa-
tion in the project activity at any time." 10 
As it stands, this sounds fine, and it surely acts as a break on some 
of the abuses that might occur if we did not require it. The problem, 
however, with informed consent being used as the overriding justifica-
tion criterion for experimentation is that few believe it is really pos-
sible to obtain. For many doctors, informed consent is that slip of 
paper that is a necessary (but as we have discovered, not sufficient) 
condition to avoid malpractice. But even if the doctor or researcher is 
committed to informed consent it is not clear if it describes a genuine 
choice. As a famous heart surgeon once told me, for a patient to make 
an informed decision to undergo heart surgery would mean he would 
have to study with him for at least three years (and that was assuming 
the patient had completed medical school). Though this certainly 
overstates the case, one may still ask whether informed consent is a 
workable moral requirement. 
Even if informed consent were a clear possibility it is still not a 
sufficient condition to justify human experimentation. In some form 
or other, informed consent is probably a necessary condition for the 
use of human subjects, but simply because some may consent to make 
themselves subject to an experiment does not mean that they should 
so consent. For persons can misuse themselves even if they do so 
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voluntarily and with full knowledge. There are some things that we 
should not do to ourselves even for the good of others . To absolutize 
informed consent does not resolve the issue of whether we ought to 
allow ourselves to be subjected to certain kinds of risks in the name of 
human good. 
Nor should this kind of problem be limited to those experiments 
which involve the greater physical risk to the subject. Indeed, I think 
that the issue is even more important in relation to the kind of experi-
ments in the social and psychological sciences where deception is 
necessary to the experimental design. It is important to remember that 
we can morally harm without physically hurting. 
Even if we can make informed consent a workable criterion for 
human experimentation there remains the problem of what we do 
about particular test populations. Should prisoners or the poor be 
subjected to human experimentation? Many argue that because of 
their disadvantaged position any informed consent they might give, in 
spite of elaborate safeguards, is inherently coercive. However , Katz 
suggests that this attitude, especially toward the poor, betrays a 
stereotypical and degrading view of them.ll To be sure, it may be 
necessary to exercise special care in respect to prisoners and the poor, 
but to deny them the opportunity to participate in the joint venture 
of our community to better our condition is to deny them the respect 
due them. (The situation of the poor may be significantly different 
than that of prisoners, however, insofar as the latter have no power to 
protect themselves. This may also be important in the use of students 
in research for while they appear free, they are in fact in a disad-
vantaged position since their future depends on being able to please 
professors. At the very least, this means that the manner of obtaining 
informed consent is very important in contexts where the one con-
senting lacks the power to withstand the suggestion that he volunteer. 
This is especially the case when the "power" is un articulated and 
informal.) 
Of course, for this last point to be viable depends on the actual 
existence of that joint venture. Yet, in fact, we know that doctors and 
medical researchers have gone to great lengths to avoid exposing the 
general population to the risks necessary for medical advances. This is 
not the place to speculate about the reasons for this, though I suspect 
it has much to do with the paternalistic attempt of doctors to protect 
us from the risks involved in normal medicine, but until medical 
experimentation is seen as an opportunity - and perhaps even an obli-
gation - for everyone, I find it hard to justify the continued use of 
prisoners and the poor as experimental subjects. Moreover, if we were 
willing to widen the opportunity for more people to participate in 
scientific research, it would necessitate the healthy development of 
making the scientific community take the time to explain what they 
are about. Or put more positively, it would help us see the stake we all 
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have, and the risks we should assume, for the development of certain 
kinds of research. 
The ethical issues raised by the use of prisoners and the poor seem 
simple when compared to the problems involved in the use of children 
and other non-competents. In order to develop certain kinds of drugs 
or procedures we can do all the animal and adult testing we want and 
still we must finally test on children - i.e., a test group who by defini-
tion cannot give informed consent. Paul Ramsey has argued that no 
one, parent or guardian, even with the best intentions, has the moral 
status to consent for a child to be made the subject of medical investi-
gation solely for the accumulation of knowledge (except when epi-
demic conditions prevail). To quote: "When there is no possible rela-
tion to the child's recovery, a child is not to be made a mere object in 
medical experimentation for the good to come." 12 If it is objected 
that this severely restricts possible advances in childhood medicine, 
Ramsey argues that the moral progress of the race is more important 
than the scientific. Thus, testing on children is the paradigm instance 
that at times it may be necessary to choose between morality and 
knowledge even though we normally assume that we do not have to 
choose between them. 
(Without developing it I at least want to suggest that not enough 
attention has been paid to the ethical issues involved in using animals 
in research. It may well be that we will learn more about what moral 
issues are involved in human research if we think more about our 
assumption that we can subject animals to almost any peril or pain for 
the good of men. Our inhumanity to our fellow man may well be a 
correlative to our unjustified insensitivity to those not of our species. )13 
5. The Basis of Informed Consent 
In conclusion I think it is interesting to ask why we have come to 
think that informed consent is so important. Above I have quoted 
Ramsey to the effect that no man is good enough to experiment upon 
another without his consent, but it is not clear why this is the case. Of 
course many would argue that no man has the right to force another 
to do what he does not want to even if it will have positive benefits 
for others. In the framework of the libertarian political ethic this 
response has some plausibility, but as I suggested this assumes an 
individualistic assumption that avoids asking what ends medicines and 
collateral research ought to serve. 
In this connection Charles Fried's recent analysis of the basis of 
informed consent seems to me to be particularly suggestive and illumi-
nating. 14 Fried argues that our commitment to the individual subject 
is based on the idea that the ethical life is primarily anchored in the 
concrete relationships in which we are involved. In other words, Fried 
suggests that the sense of care we should have for others is not based 
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on impersonal moral principles, but grows out of our more or less 
direct commitment to particular significant others. Thus we feel that 
we have obligations to our wives, children, and friends, which are 
qualitatively different from obligations to those with whom we are 
not in such relationship. Moreover, we feel that whatever our obliga-
tions to a stranger may be, they cannot override our obligation to 
those with whom we share a special relationship. If Fried is right, our 
obligation to the stranger is based on our prior commitment to partic-
ular friendships. 
Fried goes on to argue that the kind of relationship between a doctor 
and his patient is of this primary sort. Thus the ethos of medicine 
assures the patient that the doctor's concern for him or her is absolute 
- that is it would be immoral for the doctor ever to lower the quality 
of care of one patient for the good of another even if the "another" 
were a greater number. The requirement of informed and free consent 
for therapeutic as well as experimental procedures refers to one 
attempt to safeguard our fundamental commitment, then to primary 
relationships. It is to be noted therefore that the concern with the 
"rights" of the human subject is not necessarily based on the inviola-
bility of the individual, but rather grounded on the community pos-
sible between those who wish to be friends. 
But if Fried has properly identified the relationship which under-
writes the doctor's sense of commitment to each individual patient, it 
must be asked how this commitment translates into the non-thera-
peutic experimental context? If this is not the kind of relationship 
between the scientist and the human subject then even more careful 
procedures must be developed in the research context to protect the 
subject. For we must see that what we have is not a joint venture for 
medical progress or human goods secured through such progress, but a 
relationship between strangers in which one side has been given more 
power than the other in the name of science. 
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